A correctness proof of a variant of Segall's Propagation of Information with Feedback protocol is presented. The proof, which is carried out within the I/O automata model of Lynch and Tuttle, is standard except for the use of a prophecy variable. The aim of this paper is to show that, unlike what has been suggested in the literature, assertional methods based on invariant reasoning support an intuitive way to think about and understand this algorithm.
Introduction
Reasoning about distributed algorithms appears to be intrinsically di cult and will probably always require a great deal of ingenuity. Nevertheless, research on formal veri cation has provided a whole range of well-established concepts and techniques that may help us to tackle problems in this area. It seems that by now the basic principles for reasoning about distributed algorithms have been discovered and that the main issue that remains is the problem of scale: we know how to analyze small algorithms but are still lacking methods and tools to manage the complexity of the the bigger ones.
Not everybody agrees with this view, however, and frequently one can hear claims that existing approaches cannot deal in a`natural' way with certain types of distributed algorithms. A new approach is then proposed to address this problem. A recent example of this is a paper by Chou 4] , who o ers a rather pessimistic view on the state-of-the-art in formal veri cation:
At present, reasoning about distributed algorithms is still an ad hoc, trial-anderror process that needs a great deal of ingenuity. What is lacking is a practical method that supports, on the one hand, an intuitive way to think about and understand distributed algorithms and, on the other hand, a formal technique for reasoning about distributed algorithms using that intuitive understanding.
In his paper, Chou proposes an extension of the assertional methods of 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 15] , and argues that this extension allows for a more direct formalization of intuitive, operational reasoning about distributed algorithms. To illustrate his method, Chou discusses a variant of Segall's PIF (Propagation of Information with Feedback) protocol 19] . A complex and messy proof of this algorithm using existing methods is contrasted with a slightly simpler but de nitely more structured proof based on the new method.
Is the process of using assertional methods based on invariant reasoning ad hoc? Personally, I believe it is not. On the contrary, I nd that these methods provide signi cant guidance and structure to veri cations. After one has described both the algorithm and its speci cation as abstract programs, it is usually not so di cult to come up with a rst guess of a simulation relation from the state space of the algorithm to the state space of the speci cation. In order to state this simulation, it is sometimes necessary to add auxiliary history and prophecy variables to the low-level program. By just starting to prove that the guessed simulation relation is indeed a simulation, i.e., that for each execution of the low-level program there exists a corresponding execution of the high-level program, one discovers the need for certain invariants, properties that are valid for all reachable states of the programs. To state these invariant properties it is sometimes convenient or even necessary to introduce auxiliary state variables. Frequently one also has to prove other auxiliary invariants rst. The existence of a simulation relation guarantees that the algorithm is safe with respect to the speci cation: all the nite behaviors of the algorithm are allowed by the speci cation. The concepts of invariants, history and prophecy variables, and simulation relations are so powerful that in most cases they allow one to formalize the intuitive reasoning about safety properties of distributed algorithms. When a simulation (and thereby safety) has been established, this simulation often provides guidance in the subsequent proof that the algorithm satis es the required liveness properties: typically one proves that the simulation relates each fair execution of the low-level program to a fair execution of the high-level program. Here modalities from temporal logic such as \eventually" and \leads to" often make it quite easy to formalize intuitions about the liveness properties of the algorithm.
As an illustration of the use of existing assertional methods, I present in this paper a veri cation within the I/O automata model 12, 13] of the algorithm discussed by Chou 4] . Altogether, it took me about two hours to come up with a sketch of the proof (during a train ride from Leiden to Eindhoven), and about three weeks to work it out, polish it, and write this paper. The proof is routine, except for a few nice invariants and the use of a prophecy variable. Unlike history variables, which date back to the sixties 11], prophecy variables have been introduced only recently 1], and there are not that many examples of their use. My proof is not particularly short, but it does formalize in a direct way my own intuitions about the behavior of this algorithm. It might very well be the case that for more complex distributed algorithms new methods, such as the one of Chou 4] , will pay o and lead to shorter proofs that are closer to intuition. This paper shows that invariant based assertional methods still work very well for a variant of Segall's PIF protocol.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the algorithm formally as an I/O automaton. Section 3 presents the correctness criterion and the proof that the algorithm meets this criterion. Finally, Section 4 contains some conclusing remarks. Appendix A gives a brief account of those parts of I/O automata theory that are used in this paper.
Description of the Algorithm
We consider a graph G = (V; E), where V is a nonempty, nite collection of nodes and E V V is a collection of links. We assume that graph G is undirected in the sense that (v; w) 2 E , (w; v) 2 E, and connected. To each node v in the graph a value weight(v) is associated, taken from some set M. We assume that M contains an element 0 and that there is a binary operator + on M, such that (M; +; 0) is an Abelian monoid. 1 Nodes of G represent autonomous processors and links represent communication channels via which these processors can send messages to each other. We assume that the communication channels are reliable and that messages are received in the same order as they are sent. We discuss a simple distributed algorithm to compute the sum of the weights of all the nodes in the network. The algorithm is a minor 2 rephrasing of an algorithm described by Chou 4] , which in turn is a variant of Segall's PIF (Propagation of Information with Feedback) protocol 19].
The only messages that are required by the algorithm are elements from M. A node in the network enters the protocol when it receives a rst message from one of its neighbors. Initially, the communication channels for all the links are empty, except the channel associated to the link e 0 from a xed root node v 0 to itself, which contains a single message. 3 When an arbitrary node v receives a rst message, it marks the node w from which this message was received. It then sends a 0 message to all its neighbors, except w. Upon receiving subsequent messages, the values of these messages are added to the weight of v. As soon as, for a non-root node, the total number of received messages equals the total number of neighbors, the value that has been computed is sent back to the node from which the rst message was received. When, for root node v 0 , the total number of received messages equals the total number of neighbors, the value that has been computed by v 0 is produced as the nal outcome of the algorithm.
In Figure 1 , the algorithm is speci ed as an I/O automaton DSum using the standard precondition/e ect notation 12, 13, 6] . A minor subtlety is the occurrence of the variable v in the de nition of the step relation, which is neither a state variable nor a formal parameter of the actions. Semantically, the meaning of v is determined by an implicit existential quanti cation: an action a is enabled in a state s if there exists a valuation of all the variables (including v) that agrees with s on the state variables and with a on the parameters of the actions, such that the precondition of a holds under . If action a is enabled in s under then the e ect part of a and determine the resulting state s 0 .
For each link e=(v; w), the source v is denoted source(e), the target w is denoted target(e), I/O automaton DSum has three (parametrized) actions: (1) MSG, which describes the receipt and processing of a message, (2) REPORT, by which a non root node sends the nal value that it has computed to its parent, and (3) Actually, since it will turn out that DSum only has nite executions, it does not matter how we de ne the partition of DSum. The above de nition seems to be the most natural, since it re ects the intuition that each node in the network represents an autonomous processor.
Correctness Proof

Correctness Criterion
The correctness property that we want to establish is that the fair traces of DSum There is one step, which starts in the initial state, has label RESULT( P v2V weight(v)), and ends in the nal state. Finally, part(S) contains a single equivalence class fRESULT(m) j m 2 Mg.
We will prove traces(DSum) traces(S) using a standard recipe of Abadi and Lamport 1]: rst we establish a history relation from DSum to an I/O automaton DSum h , then a prophecy relation from DSum h to an I/O automaton DSum hp , and nally a re nement from DSum hp to S. The fact that traces(DSum) traces(S) does not guarantee that fairtraces(DSum) fairtraces(S). In order to prove this, we will show that DSum has no in nite sequence of consecutive internal actions and cannot get into a state of deadlock before an output step has been performed. 
Adding a History Variable
As observed by Segall 19] , a crucial property of the PIF protocol is that in each maximal execution exactly one message travels on each link. As a rst step towards the proof of this property, we will establish that in each execution of DSum at most one message travels on each link. In order to state this formally as an invariant, we add a variable rcvd to automaton DSum that records for each link e how many messages have been received on e. This variable is similar to the variable N that Segall 19] uses in his presentation of PIF to mark the receipt of a message over a link. Figure 3 We will use a state function Sent(e) to denote the number of messages sent over a link e, and a state function Rcvd(v) to denote the number of messages received by a node v. Formally, these functions are de ned by:
Sent(e) = rcvd e] + len(mq e]) Rcvd(v) = P e2to(v) rcvd e] Invariant I below gives some basic sanity properties involving rcvd e] and Rcvd(v) : at any time the number of messages received from a link is nonnegative, if a node is busy then it has received at least one message, and as soon as at least one message has been received by a node, a message has been received over the parent link, which points towards that node. The real work starts with the proof of the next invariant I 0 , which is the conjunction, for all v, of the following formulas: Even though at rst sight formula I 0 may look complicated, it is easy to give intuition for it. As long as a node v has not received any message, it does not participate is the protocol and is in state Init(v) . Upon arrival of a rst message, the node changes status and moves to busy v]. The node remains in this state until it has received a message from all its neighbors, then performs a REPORT or RESULT action, and moves to its nal state Done(v). The following \mutual exclusion" property is a logical consequence of invariant I 2 and the de nition of state functions Init and Done, and therefore holds for all reachable states of DSum h :
Together with formula I 4 (v), ME(v) says that in any reachable state each node is in exactly one of the three states Init(v), busy v] or Done(v). Formulas I 5 -I 10 specify, for each node v, for each of the three possible states of v, and for each outgoing link of v, how many messages have been sent over that link. And since this number is always either 0 or 1, this implies that during each execution at most one message can be sent over each link (formula C 1 below). In order to make the induction work, a nal conjunct I 11 is needed in I 0 that says that, except for the initial state of v, cnt v] gives the total number of links over which no message has yet been received by v. In the routine proof that I 0 is an invariant, it is convenient to use the logical consequences C 1 -C 3 of I^I 0 that are stated in Lemma 3. Properties C 4 -C 7 of Lemma 3 are also logical consequences of I^I 0 , and will play a role later on in this paper. 
Adding a Prophecy Variable
Intuitively, in the rst phase of the algorithm a spanning tree is constructed with root v 0 , and this spanning tree is used to accumulate values in the second phase. When the algorithm starts, it not clear how the spanning tree is going to look like and in fact any spanning tree is still possible. While the algorithm proceeds, the spanning tree is constructed step by step. The choice whether an arbitrary link will be part of the spanning tree depends on the relative speeds of the processors, and is entirely nondeterministic. Such unpredictable, nondeterministic behavior is typical for distributed computation but often complicates analysis.
Fortunately, the concept of a prophecy variable of Abadi and Lamport 1] allows us to reduce the nondeterminism of the algorithm or, more precisely, to push nondeterminism backwards to the initial state. We add to DSum h a new variable tree, which records an initial guess of the spanning tree and enforces (as a self-ful lling prophecy) that the actual spanning tree that is constructed during execution is equal to this initial guess. Figure 4 describes the automaton DSum hp obtained in this way. Boxes highlight the places where DSum hp di ers from DSum h . In Figure 4 , tree is a function that tells for each set of links whether or not it is a tree. More formally, for E E and V = fsource(e); target(e) j e 2 Eg, tree(E) = true i either E = ; or there exists a node v 2 V such that for all v 0 2 V there is a unique path of links in E leading from v to v 0 .
In order to show that tree is a prophecy variable in the sense of 1, 14], we establish a prophecy relation from DSum h to DSum hp (see Appendix A.3 Proof: Since u:tree = u 0 :tree and u 0 j = T 2 , also u j = T 2 . In order to show the remaining properties, we distinguish between three cases. ! t and (t) = s. Thus, in order to prove the induction step it su ces to show that t 0 is reachable. By Lemma 5, u 0 j = T 1 (w), for all w. Therefore, by de nition of t 0 , t 0 j = T 1 (w), for all w 6 = v. Since s 0 j = :busy v] and s 0 is reachable and enables a MSG step, s 0 j = Init(v) by C 3 (e). This implies t 0 j = Init(v), and therefore t 0 j = T 1 (v). We prove that t 0 satis es the three conjuncts of T 2 :
1. In this subsection we will prove the existence of a re nement from DSum hp to S. For this we need two nal invariants, which state that non-unit messages can only travel on the reversed spanning tree, and that there is a conservation of weight in the network.
Lemma 10 For all reachable states of DSum hp and for all e, The fact that traces(DSum) traces(S) does not imply fairtraces(DSum) fairtraces(S). It might be that DSum does not produce any output but instead performs an in nite sequence of consecutive internal actions or gets into a state of deadlock before an output step has been done. However, using Lemma 4, we can prove the absence of divergent computation: History relations together with re nements form a complete proof method for trace inclusion if the abstract automaton is deterministic 14]. Since I/O automaton S is trivially deterministic, this means that at least in theory there is no need to use prophecy variables in the correctness proof of DSum. In fact, it is not so di cult to eliminate the prophecy variable construction from this paper. The key step is to establish as an additional invariant that for all reachable states of DSum h the set fpar v] j v 6 = v 0^: Init(v)g forms a tree with root v 0 . This alternative proof is even slightly shorter than the proof outlined in this paper. However, I do not think that this is an argument against the use of the prophecy variable tree. This auxiliary variable formalizes an important intuition about the algorithm, namely that in each execution a spanning tree is constructed. By xing this tree, the prophecy variable makes it conceptually simpler to reason about the algorithm.
Since forward simulations form a complete proof method for trace inclusion if the abstract automaton is deterministic 14], the history variable rcvd can be eliminated from the proof of this paper in favor of a forward simulation relation. But again, even though this will probably lead to a small reduction in the size of the proof, there are good reasons to keep this auxiliary variable. In the intuitive reasoning about the protocol the number of messages received over the links plays an important role, and the history variable construction makes it possible to formalize this reasoning.
The veri cation of this paper has not yet been proof-checked by computer. I think that it will be worthwhile to do this, building on earlier work of 20, 6, 17, 3] . An interesting question here is whether the correctness of the history variable construction can be veri ed fully automatically by a theorem prover, by simply checking the (trivial) proof obligations of a history relation (This would eliminate the need to formalize the meta-theory of history variables.). Another question is whether the prophecy variable construction can be formalized easily, or whether it is simpler to formalize a proof that does not use this construction.
Although I have carried out the veri cation using the I/O automaton model, it is probably trivial to translate this story to other state based models, such as Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions 10] . Since liveness issues do not play a role, also a process algebraic veri cation in a calculus such as CRL 5] should not be too di cult.
A.1 I/O automata
An action signature S is a triple (in(S); out(S); int(S)) of three disjoint sets of respectively input actions, output actions and internal actions. The derived sets of external actions, locally controlled actions and actions of S are de ned respectively by ext(S) = in(S) out(S); local(S) = out(S) int(S); acts(S) = in(S) out(S) int(S):
An I/O automaton A ( where one automaton is required to simulate a step from the other automaton, this is possible with an execution fragment consisting of exactly one step. 4 A relation R over S 1 and S 2 is image-nite if for all elements s 1 of S 1 there are only nitely many elements s 2 of S 2 such that (s 1 ; s 2 ) 2 R. Theorem 16 ( 14] ) Let 
